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Background: The links between pollution, institutions, and economic growth may be not so univocal as argued in
the literature, as these factors may influence each other since some reverse causality may exist between them. The
understanding of this relationship is important for identifying appropriate policies for sustainable development.
Methods: We investigate the long-run relationship between pollution, institutions, and economic growth,
considering as variables carbon dioxide emissions, rule of law, and income. The model offers an analysis of
causality direction using a panel-VAR approach for the period 1996–2010 for 33 high-income countries that
include advanced, emerging, and former-transition economies.
Results: The results demonstrate a positive reverse causality relationship between the rule of law and income,
indicating that higher income implies stronger rule of law and vice versa. The rule of law is found to have a
negative relationship with pollution, confirming that the enforcement of rules is “a conditio sine qua non” to
control emissions. No causality relationship is found for pollution and income that can be due to the
different stages of economic development of emerging, former-transition, and developed economies, implying
heterogeneity in their environmental protection policies.
Conclusions: We argue that the rule of law matters both for economic growth and environment, working as
a go-between and creating a win–win situation, where stronger institutions increase the levels of income and
vice versa. In order to enhance sustainable development, a policy maker should allocate additional resources
for both monitoring the application of the rule of law and its enforcement.
Keywords: Environment; Rule of law; Growth; High-income countriesBackground
Introduction
The goals of sustainable development cannot be
achieved without incurring in two important factors.
One is the state intervention and, therefore, the quality
of governance. In fact, environmental protection mea-
sures are rarely adopted without regulatory stimuli. The
other factor, tightly linked to the first one, is the quality of
institutional context. Institutions determine the implemen-
tation and outcome of governmental policies, reflecting
the capacity to manage environmental issues. The quality* Correspondence: davide.infante@unical.it
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the Creative Commons license, and indicate ifof institutions influences the degree by which a society is
involved in the process of environmental renaissance.
Stronger institutions imply environmental awareness, thus
opting for environmental protection as an active sustain-
ability policy. The above mechanism is, as argued, strongly
tied with economic growth since stronger institutional
context enhances the process of economic development.
It is often maintained that an increase in income coming
from the reinforcement of institutions implies an increase
in demand for environmental protection, leading to pollu-
tion abatement. Therefore, the reinforcement of the insti-
tutional context can create a win–win situation in the
sense that it may improve both environmental protection
and the level of income of a country. Alternatively, if the
reinforcement of the institutional context does not implyticle is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0
rg/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and
e appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to
changes were made.
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difficult to implement. A similar mechanism can be ad-
dressed to the role of income that enhances institutional
enforcement and, therefore, pollution abatement. In turn,
as argued, pollution should be given only a partial role in
the reverse causality direction. However, the increase of
pollution could imply greater income if we consider emer-
ging and developing countries that do possess strong insti-
tutional context, but it should not be so in developed
economies where strong institutions contribute to abate
pollution.
An example of these scenarios is the development of
shale mining that has started in recent years in different
countries. Given its potentially negative impact on envir-
onment, shale mining can represent an opportunity for
environmentally friendly economic growth in the coun-
tries that have stringent institutions [1]. At the same
time, economic growth that is accompanied by severe
environmental damage is the threat that countries with a
still weak institutional context may face [2].
Although there exists a wide range of literature focusing
on the relationship between economic growth, environ-
mental quality, and institutional context, little attention
has been paid to their causal relationship. Most of these
studies have considered a unidirectional causal relation-
ship, treating income, emissions, or institutions as exogen-
ous variables [3–5]. While, we argue that reverse causality
may exist. This study improves upon previous studies by
providing the evidence of the existence of a long-term re-
lationship between rule of law, carbon dioxide emissions,
and income per capita and by investigating the endogene-
ity of the three variables in a panel data of high-income
countries for the period from 1996 to 2010. For the best
of our knowledge, no empirical evidence has yet emerged
regarding this issue.
Related literature
As known from the literature, stronger institutional con-
text enhances the process of economic development and
growth [6–8]. At the same time, economic growth has
itself an important impact on environmental quality. Nu-
merous authors demonstrate that the level of pollution
increases gradually starting from lower levels of per
capita income but then decreases, after reaching a peak
at higher levels of income [9, 10].
As for the links between environment and institutions,
numerous scholars have demonstrated that the success-
ful implementation of environmental policies is deter-
mined by institutional strength. For example, corruption
has been shown to have a negative effect on environ-
mental quality, undermining the effectiveness of envir-
onmental policies [3, 11, 12]. In contrast, strong
institutions in the form of political liberties, civil rights,
and democracy positively contribute to environmentalquality [13], as have secure property rights [4] and legal
protection [14]. Reinforcement of the rule of law is
found to reduce the degree of environmental damage
and to enhance the application of sustainable policies
[15, 16]. Finally, economic openness [17] and flexible state
policies [18] are proved to incentivise the adoption of en-
vironmental technologies. Other studies analyze the diffu-
sion of new environmental technologies and the level of
pollution in relation to persisting rent-seeking activities
and the corruption of economic agents [19–21].
Finally, from a methodological point of view, our work
is related to [22] where the link between economic
openness, pollution, and income is analyzed by applying
the Vector Autoregression methodology (VAR) to cross-
section data of heterogeneous countries. Despite some
differences in the specification of the empirical model
and estimation methodologies, the distinguishing feature
of our paper is the analysis of the interdependence be-
tween pollution, institutional context, and economic
growth for high-income economies. In particular, we
focus our attention to the analysis of causality direction
between three important factors regarding sustainable
development: carbon dioxide emissions, rule of law, and
income per capita, using a panel-VAR approach.Methods
High-income countries: income, rule of law, and carbon
dioxide emissions
Although the causality relationship between environ-
mental quality, institutions, and income is expected to
be heterogeneous among countries, an important em-
phasis in understanding this relationship should be given
to high-income economies. The rationality behind this is
that high-income economies constitute a model for mak-
ing comparisons for other countries since these countries
normally define the rules of the game in a sustainability
perspective. This is done not only by setting environmen-
tal regulations but also by their enforcement assured by
their more stringent institutional context. It should be
noted that, although these economies are part of the same
income group, their points of departure are very different,
given that their similar levels of income are obtained by
different environmental tendencies. In fact, among these
countries, there are mature economies, characterized by
intensive domestic consumption and transferring produc-
tion processes abroad together with the emission of pol-
lutants. There are also emerging economies that rely upon
resources exportation or importation of production pro-
cesses at home markets which damage their environment.
Some former-transition countries are part of the high-
income group. These countries have not yet started to
transfer their production processes abroad and have there-
fore a larger domestic production.
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ation the rule of law given its importance for the imple-
mentation of environmental policy as well as for social
awareness of environmental sustainability. Although
some studies take into account the rule of law [23–25],
to the best of our knowledge, there are very few works
[26, 27, 15] that analyze this institution from an environ-
mental perspective. As for the choice of the pollutant, we
concentrate our attention to carbon dioxide, which is one
of the most considered energy-related pollutant and a
major source of the greenhouse effect. As known, one of
the primary sustainability challenges consists in the transi-
tion of energy to sustainable energy supply systems aimed
at the reduction of carbon dioxide emissions. The reduction
of this type of pollution is always socially mediated through
environmental policies, primarily through energy policies,
and rarely occurs by natural forces. Clearly, the observable
trends of carbon dioxide emissions are expected to reflect
the degree of environmental awareness of the society as
well as the functionality of sustainability-oriented policies.
The relationship between economic development, en-
vironmental quality, and institutional enforcement can
be described as follows. The rule of law enforcement
leads to an increase in income that brings about higher
pollution in early stages of economic development.
However, the increase in income induced by institutional
development causes economic agents to increase the de-
mand for a clean environment. Consequently, a country
tends to follow a pattern of rising pollution levels as insti-
tutional development proceeds, which will be accompan-
ied by declining pollution and better institutional quality
at a more advanced stage of economic development.
These linkages are illustrated in Fig. 1 for 33 high-income
economies, classified by the World Bank, that include 18
developed, 8 emerging, as well as 7 post-transition eco-
nomies. The figure shows the distribution of income, car-
bon dioxide, and rule of law among the countries. The
height of bars corresponds to the percentage of a country’s
values of each variable (income, rule of law, and emissions)
with respect to the country with the highest value of these
variables, considering the mean value of the period. As can
be seen, despite some exceptions, countries with higher
levels of pollution are also those that have lower levels of
rule of law. Moreover, although there are no highly accen-
tuated differences in income, since the countries belong to
the same income group, it can be noted that countries that
produce higher pollution rates have also lower income
levels. In fact, among the first ten countries with the higher
carbon dioxide emissions, eight belong to emerging or
post-transition economies.
Model and data
The relationship between the three variables is estimated
by applying the vector autoregression model for paneldata, a technique that “combines the traditional VAR ap-
proach, which treats all the variables in the system as
endogenous, with the panel-data approach, which allows
for unobserved individual heterogeneity” [28]. The
model specified as a first-order VAR, in the reduced
form, can be expressed in the following way:
yit ¼ A0 þ A1yit−1 þ f i þ dt þ uit ð1Þ
where yit is a (3 × 1) vector of our variables (rule of law,
pollution, and income), fi is a vector of country-specific
effects, dt is a vector of time effect, and uit is an inde-
pendent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) disturbance
vector.
The vector of country-specific effects is a necessary
part of the model, given that in applying a panel-VAR,
the restriction that the underlying structure is the same
for each cross-sectional unit is required [28]. In order to
allow for individual heterogeneity in the levels, fixed ef-
fects are introduced and denoted by fi in the model. Fol-
lowing [28] and [29], the variables are time-demeaned
and the fixed individual effects are removed by the Hel-
mert transformation method. This procedure removes
the mean of all the future observations available for each
country-year. This transformation preserves the orthog-
onality between transformed variables and lagged regres-
sors so that according to the abovementioned authors [28]
and [29], lagged regressors can be used as instruments to
estimate the coefficients by GMM. Finally, country-
specific time dummies (dt) are added to the model to cap-
ture aggregate, country-specific macro shocks that may
affect countries in the same way. These dummies are elim-
inated by subtracting the means of each variable calcu-
lated for each country-year (see [28] for more details).
As noted above, the panel data contains 33 high-
income countries, classified by the World Bank for the
period from 1996 to 2010. The sample contains coun-
tries that are unified by income criteria as they are clas-
sified by the World Bank as high-income countries. That
is a good starting point, since our aim is to verify a long-
run relationship using countries that were not “cherry
picked” to fit ex-ante criteria. For example, they do not
all belong to the same “club,” such as the OECD, where
the accession procedure is complex as it involves a series
of examinations to assess a country’s ability to meet
OECD standards in a wide range of policy areas. For us,
it is most important to see if countries that had different
patterns of development register the same relationship
between income, pollution, and the rule of law.
The income variable (GDP), expressed as GDP per capita
(in constant 2005 US$) as well as the pollution variable
(Poll), expressed as carbon dioxide emissions per capita
(in kg per 2011 PPP $ of GDP), are taken from [30]. The
index of rule of law (RoL) that varies from −2.5 to +2.5 is
1 Estonia   12 Kuwait   23 Denmark 
2 Bahrain   13 Finland   24 Spain 
3 Poland   14 Slovenia   25 Portugal 
4 Czech Republic   15 Greece   26 Italy 
5 Australia   16 Oman   27 Austria 
6 Korea, Rep.   17 Hungary   28 Equatorial Guinea 
7 United States   18 Japan   29 Singapore 
8 Slovak Republic  19 New Zealand   30 France 
9 Israel    20 Croatia   31 Norway 
10 Saudi Arabia   21 United Kingdom  32 Sweden 
11 Cyprus   22 Netherlands   33 Switzerland 
Fig. 1 Distribution of GDP, pollution, and rule of law among countries
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our variables.
Results and discussion
The first step of our analysis is to provide the unit root
test of our variables. There is a variety of methods pro-
posed for implementing the stationarity tests for panel
data, and each has been widely used in the literature of
applied economics. In this study, five stationarity tests
are used: LLC [32], IPS [33], Breitung [34], Fisher [35],
and the Hadri [36]. The results are shown in Table 2.
The five tests have different null hypotheses. In particu-
lar, the first four tests have the null hypothesis of non-
stationarity (I(1) behavior), while the Hadri test has aTable 1 Descriptive statistics
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
GDP 495 26,249.66 14,128.08 1093.21 67,804.55
Poll 495 0.31 0.14 0.04 1.13
RoL 495 1.07 0.72 −1.45 2.00null of stationarity (I(0) behavior). With the exception of
the LLC test, which confirms that RoL and Poll are
stationary variables, all the other tests display that the var-
iables appear to be non-stationary in level but stationary
in the first differences, taking into account the logarithms
for GDP and Poll.
We, therefore, provide cointegration tests (Table 3)
based on error correction, developed by [37] for panel
data. The null hypothesis of these tests is the absence of
cointegration. The Ga and Gt statistics test if cointegra-
tion exists for at least one observation. The Pa and Pt
statistics pool information over all the cross-sectional
units to test whether there exists cointegration for the
panel as a whole. According to our results, cointegration
can be accepted only at 10 % and not in all cases. Since
the level of significance is very low, we can proceed to
estimate the vector auto-regressive model.
The estimation results of panel-VAR for high-income
countries, shown in Table 4, demonstrate the long-run
relationship between income, pollution, and the rule of
law. The results show that in these countries, income
Table 2 Unit root test
LLC IPS Breitung Fisher Hadri
GDP −0.554 0.003 1.078 68.221 24.663
0.289 0.501 0.859 0.402 0.000
d.GDP −4.909 −3.676 −4.669 142.41 1.227
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.110
Poll −3.746 2.907 3.154 42.061 16.464
0.000 0.998 0.999 0.991 0.000
d.Poll .. −7.022 −3.997 267.87 −1.444
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.926
RoL −3.914 −1.354 −1.684 84.69 14.11
0.000 0.088 0.046 0.061 0.000
d.RoL .. −9.076 −7.409 294.89 −0.067
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.527
Note: p value in italics
Table 4 P-VAR estimation results
Parameter S. E. Student’s t
Eq. 1: dep. Var: GDP(t)
GDP(t-l) 0.808*** 0.071 11.390
Poll(t-l) −0.024 0.031 −0.783
RoL(t-l) 0.054* 0.033 1.651
Eq. 2: dep. Var: RoL(t)
GDP(t-l) 0.053*** 0.018 2.950
Poll(t-l) −0.020 0.018 −1.131
RoL(t-l) 0.743*** 0.032 22.984
Eq. 3: dep. Var: Poll(t)
GDP(t-l) 0.002 0.112 0.017
Poll(t-l) 0.810*** 0.107 7.568
RoL(t-l) −0.103** 0.049 −2.106
The three variable VAR model is estimated by GMM; country-time and fixed
effects are removed prior to estimation. Reported numbers show the coefficients
of regressing the row variables on lags of the column variables. Heteroskedasticity
adjusted t-statistics are reported
***Indicates significance at 1 % level; **indicates significance at 5 % level;
*indicates significance at 10 % level
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income implies better institutional quality (Eq. 2 in Table 4),
while a stronger rule of law leads to a higher degree of GDP
per capita (Eq. 1 in Table 4) and a lower level of pollution
(Eq. 3 in Table 4). This means that wealthier countries are
in a virtuous cycle since by reinforcing their rule of law they
produce higher income that in turn calls for a stronger in-
stitutional context.
Interestingly, the results demonstrate that the institu-
tional context plays an important role in increasing envir-
onmental protection: a high rule of law implies lower
emission levels (Eq. 3 in Table 4), while, as expected, pol-
lution has no influence on the rule of law (Eq. 2 in
Table 4). The relationship between income and pollution
(Eqs. 1 and 3 in Table 4) is not significant. We would ex-
pect that either intensive economic activity should pro-
duce more pollution due to production and consumption
or, on the contrary, intensive economic activity should
produce less pollution due to environmental awareness.
The fact that income may not influence pollution and vice
versa could be given to the different stages of economic
development of emerging, former-transition, and devel-
oped economies, and, consequently, for their heteroge-
neous degree of environmental protection.
The final step of this analysis is to evaluate impulse re-
sponses that refer to the effect of a shock in a variable
on the other variables in the model. As it can be seenTable 3 Panel cointegration test





Robust critical value obtained bootstrapping with 1000 replicationsfrom Table 5, the shocks have either a positive or nega-
tive impact on the rule of law, pollution, and income.
The impulse responses are consistent with the results
obtained by VAR analysis and confirm our previous find-
ings. It should however be noted that the estimated
impulse responses are characterized by the shocks that
appear to have persistent effects. As Table 5 demon-
strates, the impulse responses are significantly different
from zero, which suggests that shocks may have persis-
tent influence in our framework.
Conclusions
Our paper contributes to the understanding of the rela-
tionship between environmental quality, institutional con-
text, and economic growth. As known, some links of the
above relationship have already been emphasized in the lit-
erature. In fact, there is a large consensus on the positive
contribution of institutions to economic development and
environmental quality. A smaller consensus is expressed
on the impact of economic development on the environ-
ment that is found to be positive or negative, depending on
the stage of the economic development itself. At the same
time, to the best of our knowledge, there is very little con-
tribution on the causality relationships between the above
three variables that, as we argue, play a crucial role for eco-
nomic policies that search to reconcile growth and a clean
environment. Our work aims, therefore, to fill in these la-
cunae and investigates on a long-run causal relationship
between carbon emissions, rule of law, and income.
We claim that this relationship has a particular im-
portance for high-income economies that, as global
country leaders, plays a decisive role in determining
Table 5 Impulse responses of variable in varname to the shock
in column variable
Varname s Order GDP Poll RoL
GDP 0 1 0.0384 0.0000 0.0000
1 1 0.0312 −0.0027 0.0032
2 1 0.0254 −0.0045 0.0051
3 1 0.0208 −0.0057 0.0061
4 1 0.0171 −0.0063 0.0066
5 1 0.0141 −0.0065 0.0066
6 1 0.0117 −0.0065 0.0064
Poll 0 2 0.0014 0.1089 0
1 2 0.0009 0.0883 −0.0061
2 2 0.0003 0.0719 −0.0095
3 2 −0.0002 0.0587 −0.0111
4 2 −0.0007 0.048 −0.0115
5 2 −0.001 0.0394 −0.0113
6 2 −0.0013 0.0324 −0.0106
RoL 0 3 0.0035 −0.002 0.0594
1 3 0.0046 −0.0037 0.0442
2 3 0.005 −0.0047 0.0331
3 3 0.0051 −0.0052 0.025
4 3 0.0049 −0.0053 0.0192
5 3 0.0045 −0.0053 0.0148
6 3 0.0041 −0.0051 0.0116
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and sustainability policies. For this reason, we imple-
mented in our analysis a set of panel data that considers
33 high-income countries of World Bank classification
(that includes developed as well as former-transition
and emerging economies) for a period of 13 years
(1996–2010).
Our results confirmed the presence of a complex rela-
tionship between carbon dioxide emissions, rule of law
index, and income per capita in a set of panel data. They
demonstrated a positive double causality long-run rela-
tionship between the rule of law and income per capita,
indicating that as income increases, more respect for the
rule of law is acquired and vice versa. We also found
that the rule of law has a negative relationship with pol-
lution, confirming that the enforcement of rules is “a
conditio sine qua non” to control pollution, while the re-
verse causality, i.e., that pollution influences the rule of
law, does not hold. Moreover, the results demonstrated
that pollution and income have no double causality rela-
tionship. This can be explained by the different stages of
economic development of emerging, former-transition,
and developed economies, which implies heterogeneity
in environmental protection. We can conclude that, in
high-income economies, a reinforcement of the rule oflaw leads to a win–win situation, where stronger institu-
tions increase the levels of income and vice versa, with
pollution reduction generated by institutional stringency
and high income.
As an overall result, we can affirm that the rule of law
is an institution that works in-between economic growth
and environment. From these findings, some important
policy implications can be drawn. Firstly, policy makers
that aim to enhance economic growth can use this insti-
tution and be aware that it would promote not only
growth but, in turn, would also reinforce the institu-
tional context. Secondly, the reinforcement of the rule of
law is essential for controlling the environmental quality.
Independently of the policies adopted (taxes, subsidies,
emission standards, etc.), to achieve the goals of sustain-
able development, it is crucial that the rules are clear,
applied, and enforced. In turn, increasing pollution does
not necessarily call for environmental awareness that,
for some of the countries, could mean the weakness of
environmental regulations and unenforced rule of law.
Finally, it could be difficult for policy makers to address
directly the relationship between economic growth and
pollution and vice versa. The countries’ patterns to reach
a high level of income are very different and it is not
easy to disentangle a significant relationship between
growth and pollution that can characterize all the coun-
tries. This could explain the reasons why some countries
are so reluctant to adhere to international protocols to
reduce their pollution levels.
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